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1. Introduction 
A substantial body of evidence from laboratory and field studies documents that people cooperate 
more in public goods games than implied by the selfish free-riding equilibrium (for surveys, see 
e.g., Ledyard, 1995; Zelmer, 2003; Gächter, 2007; Chaudhuri, 2011). Over the past 25 years, 
multiple explanations have been proposed for the observed levels of cooperation in social 
dilemmas—among them, confusion, altruism, warm-glow, inequity aversion, efficiency 
preferences, and reciprocity (see, for instance, Andreoni, 1990, 1995; Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997; 
Anderson et al., 1998; Houser and Kurzban, 2002). A more recent approach to public goods 
experiments, pioneered by Fischbacher et al. (2001), has focused on classifying individuals as 
types of contributors (see also Kelley and Stahelski, 1970; Andreoni, 1988; Keser and van 
Winden, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). The most prominent types in such public goods 
experiments are conditional cooperators, who increase their contribution with the (expected) 
contribution of other group members; free-riders, who do not contribute at all; and triangle 
(hump-shaped) contributors, who increase their contributions to the public good up to a certain 
level of (expected) others’ contributions and then reduce them (see, Kocher et al., 2008; 
Herrmann and Thöni, 2009; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Volk et al., 2012; Martinsson et. al., 
2013). Despite small differences, the overall distribution of types is surprisingly robust across 
studies and locations, with conditional cooperators representing the most frequent type (usually 
around half of the decision makers or more), followed by free-riders (around 20 %-30 %), and 
triangle contributors. 
However, discrepancies still remain between empirical results and existing theoretical 
frameworks. For instance, a majority of decision makers contribute intermediate amounts, 
whereas linear models of other-regarding preferences predict corner solutions (e.g., Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999). Though one may solve the problem by assuming non-linear forms of other-
regarding preferences, many existing models have difficulties in explaining other stylized facts 
from public goods experiments, such as—in its repeated version—the decay of contributions over 
time, or the so-called “re-start effect.” 
The aim of our paper is to contribute to the literature on motives for cooperation in social 
dilemmas. We present a model of rational self-control, which captures the conflict between pro-
social and self-interested behavior—and which lends itself to straightforward application in social 
dilemmas. The model relies on two main ingredients: other-regarding preferences and a self-
control cost, based on the dual-self model of Fudenberg and Levine (2006). Furthermore, we 
model the conflict between free-riding and contributing to the public good as a two-stage 
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cognitive problem, with an identification stage and a contribution stage, at which, willpower and 
the average contribution of other group members jointly determine the individual’s contribution 
level. Our model captures the notion that individuals may feel tempted to act in self-interest, 
while simultaneously holding a “better judgment” to cooperate. This could be thought of as a 
conflict between an impulse of greed and a commitment to abide by a social norm. Accordingly, 
we generate two propositions: (1) decision makers, who identify self-control conflict, cooperate 
more with higher levels of self-control, and (2) this relationship is attenuated for higher levels of 
risk aversion.  
We test our model in the laboratory by implementing a linear public goods game, after 
which we measure trait self-control, the perception of conflict, and risk preferences. In line with 
our predictions, players who reported that they experienced conflict contributed significantly 
more if their level of self-control was high. Moreover, controlling for self-control levels, a higher 
level of risk aversion is associated with lower levels of contributions. That is, more risk-averse 
individuals were more likely to avoid incurring the costs of self-control effort to behave 
cooperatively. Finally, free-riders were much less likely to experience conflict than were 
conditional cooperators. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses models and motives 
of cooperation in public good games, and Section 3 relates the concept of self-control to 
cooperation. Section 4 introduces our model, and Section 5 describes our experimental design. 
We present in Section 6 our experimental results. Section 7 discusses our findings and concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. Explaining cooperation in social dilemmas 
A rudimentary overview of the motivations for cooperation in social dilemmas may be organized 
along three lines: (i) other-regarding preferences about outcomes; (ii) other-regarding preferences 
about intentions (reciprocity) and strategic motivations; and (iii) bounded-rationality. Notably, 
existing models struggle to account for all empirical regularities. 
Other-regarding preferences about outcomes—such as altruism, inequity aversion  or 
efficiency concerns—were among the first explanations of positive contributions in public goods 
games, together with warm glow, which is an explanation in itself (for the early literature, see 
Andreoni, 1990, 1995; Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997; Anderson et al., 1998). However, existing 
models of other-regarding preferences about outcomes—due to their linearity—struggle to 
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explain intermediate contribution levels. Thus, they cannot easily account for decay of 
cooperation over time, in repeated games. 
Other-regarding preferences about intentions have become popular. Essentially, there 
are two strands to this literature. One, going back to Kreps et al. (1982), addresses strategic 
reputation. The basic notion is that players seek to establish a cooperative reputation by providing 
positive contributions in early rounds, and so self-interested players have an incentive to manage 
the beliefs of cooperative group members. This mechanism applies in repeated interaction. A 
more recent framework assumes heterogeneity in other-regarding preferences. Players want to 
reciprocate the expected positive contributions of others (e.g., Keser and van Winden, 2000; 
Fischbacher et al., 2001; Croson, 2007). For example, Croson (2007) finds evidence supporting 
impure altruism (e.g., Andreoni, 1990) and (simultaneous) reciprocity (e.g., Sugden, 1984) over 
models of (Kantian) commitment (e.g., Laffont, 1975; Harsanyi, 1980). Specifically, she finds 
that a given player’s contribution correlates positively with the amount contributed by other 
players, ruling in favor of a reciprocity model. However, her regressions also yield a positive 
intercept, which points toward an altruism model. Such reasoning works both in a one-shot and in 
repeated environments, and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) show that preferences for 
cooperation elicited in a one-shot game can predict the dynamics of contributions in a repeated 
game. That is, the interaction between free riders and conditional cooperators, or even the 
interaction between conditional cooperators with a self-serving bias (matching others’ 
contributions imperfectly), can account for the decay of contributions over time. 
One recent theoretical contribution that combines the two strands is that of Ambrus and 
Pathak (2011), which integrates the two aforementioned strands of other-regarding preferences 
about intentions. The model assumes a mixed population of players, who are either self-interested 
or reciprocal. In repeated games, self-interested players may contribute initially to induce 
reciprocal players to contribute in return. Thus, mean contributions decay over time, as the end of 
play approaches and the incentive for selfish players to induce cooperation fades. Restarting the 
game restores incentives for selfish players to contribute once more. The model, however, 
requires repeated interaction to allow for cooperation, as does the explanation provided by Kreps 
et al. (1982). Models of strategic cooperation thus fail to account for cooperation in one-shot 
public goods games—which is widely observed. 
The third class of models requires some level of bounded rationality. The early 
contributions were based on the concept of “confusion.” Participants in public goods games were 
thought to be confused in early rounds, resulting in over-contributions, but they would learn the 
optimal strategy as play progressed. Thus, their contributions would drop with rounds played. 
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This explanation, however, is hard to reconcile with the oft-observed slow decay. It is also 
inconsistent with the so-called “restart effect;” after contributions have decayed over a pre-
announced number of rounds—whereupon subjects are unwittingly invited to play the game once 
more—the contribution pattern repeats itself (e.g., Andreoni, 1988; Andreoni, 1995; Houser and 
Kurzban, 2002; Neugebauer et al., 2009). 
Several additional recent models take “confusion” into account by explicitly modeling the 
extent of bounded rationality. In Kandori (2002), for example, the individual gains utility over 
material payoffs, as well as a “psychological utility,” which arises from a desire to follow the 
norm, captured by the median behavior of others. In addition, individual behavior is subject to 
random shocks, which account for the decay of contributions over time. In Figuières et al. (2013), 
players have in mind an ideal contribution level (as in, Nyborg, 2000; Brekke et al., 2013), but as 
play progresses over the rounds, they adjust contributions downwards, towards the mean 
contributions of others. In both cases, the extent of bounded rationality—random shocks and non-
equilibrium beliefs—is relatively small. Klumpp (2012) allows a greater deviation from classical 
rationality, by assuming that players are satisficers, content with reaching a contribution level 
slightly below their optimum. The model consists of an additively separable utility function, with 
“material utility” and “psychological utility,” the latter of which depends on the average 
contribution of others. Thus, the model accounts for the decay of cooperation over time and the 
re-start effect.1 
Similar to many of the aforementioned approaches, our model features a utility function 
with an other-regarding preference component, combined with a specific form of bounded 
rationality: the self-control problem. More specifically, our model contains a cost of deviating 
from the mean contribution of others. One may interpret this term as a preference for reciprocity, 
or a desire to match a norm. The sensitivity to this cost is measured by a parameter that is 
interpreted as one dimension of a decision maker’s type. We assume that individuals are tempted 
to behave in a self-interested manner and may therefore not fully match the contributions of 
others. How closely players match the mean contribution of others also depends on another type 
dimension, namely willpower. Willpower is captured by a parameter that measures how costly it 
is for the individual to overcome selfish urges. The combination in our model, of other-regarding 
preferences and the self-control problem, can account for all aforementioned empirical 
regularities observed in public goods games. Although we do not apply our model to the repeated 
                                                
1 There is also an extensive literature on neurophysiological foundations of cooperation and on emotions 
and punishment (e.g., Joffily et al., 2014; Boyce et al., 2015; Dickinson and Masclet, 2015). 
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setting, it would be straightforward to extend it to account for decay of contributions and the re-
start effect. 
 
 
3. Self-control and cooperation 
There is a growing empirical literature on the relationship between cooperation and constructs 
closely related to self-control. Roughly speaking, we can organize this literature according to 
three types of psychological constructs studied: (i) time preferences; (ii) intuitive versus reflective 
responses; and (iii) trait self-control. Each of the constructs captures important aspects of 
generally accepted conceptualizations of the self-control problem. A typical conceptualization—
adopted in this paper—views the self-control problem as an intra-personal conflict between 
“better judgment” and “temptation” (e.g., Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Schelling, 1984; 
Loewenstein, 1996). This view is consistent with a variety of common modeling approaches (e.g., 
Ainslie, 1992; Laibson, 1997; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001; Bénabou and Tirole, 2002; Bodner and 
Prelec, 2003; Bénabou and Tirole, 2004; Battaglini et al., 2005; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006; 
Myrseth and Wollbrant, 2013). 
An early paper that addresses the relationship between cooperation and self-control 
considered time preferences. Curry et al. (2008) find that individuals’ discount rates are 
negatively associated with their contributions to the public account. That is, more impatient 
individuals contribute less to the public good than do patient ones. Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) 
combine laboratory data on time preferences, as well as extraction in a common pool resource 
problem, with field data on the catches of fishermen in Brazil. Their data indicate that those in the 
experiment who exhibited less impatient behavior were in the field less likely to over-exploit the 
common pool resource, but in a laboratory study no more or less likely to cooperate. Consistent 
with the aforementioned results, Burks et al. (2009) report a positive association between “short-
term” patience—the β in the β-δ model—and cooperative behavior in a sequential prisoner’s 
dilemma. Houser et al. (2012) subjected children to a common pool resource problem, in which a 
delay-of-gratification task (an analogue to the classic “marshmallow” problem) represented the 
resource extraction. They find that younger children were more likely to extract the resource than 
were older children, who are presumed more able to exercise self-control (e.g., Mischel and 
Metzner, 1962). Taken together, the existing literature on cooperation and time preferences would 
be consistent with the notion that self-control benefits cooperation. 
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However, studies that explore whether cooperation derives from intuitive or deliberative 
thought processes—that is, whether cooperation represents a “default” response—paint a 
conflicting picture. Building on dual process theories (for a review, see Alós-Ferrer and Strack, 
2014), these studies typically rely on the measurement or manipulation of decision times, on the 
assumption that more intuitive responses are quicker. Several papers report negative associations 
between decision times and cooperation in social dilemmas (Rand et al., 2012; Lotito et al., 2013; 
Rand et al., 2014), and some also find that inducing people to decide quicker causes them to 
cooperate more (Rand et al., 2012; Rand et al., 2014). Furthermore, Nielsen et al. (2013) report 
that free-riders, classified according to the Fischbacher et al. (2001) taxonomy, exhibited shorter 
decision times than did conditional cooperators. However, Tinghӧg et al. (2013) find null effects 
of time pressure and one negative effect, notably, after excluding participants who failed 
comprehension but including those who disobeyed the time constraint. Verkoeijen and 
Bouwmeester (2014) report null effects, and Lohse et al. (2014) find that decision times are 
positively associated with cooperation, both for within- and between-individual comparisons. 
More recently, Myrseth and Wollbrant (2015a) re-examine the data from Rand et al. (2012) and 
Rand et al. (2014). They argue that the vast majority of the cooperation decisions in the two 
papers are too slow to allow discrimination of intuitive response from deliberative decision.2 
The empirical part of this paper belongs to a third category, which examines the 
association between trait self-control and cooperation. Martinsson et al. (2014) implemented in a 
public goods game framing treatments that were intended to raise or lower the likelihood that 
individuals identify a self-control conflict. The idea was that individuals may or may not perceive 
a self-control conflict between urges to act in self-interest and better judgment to cooperate—and 
that they would engage self-control for the purpose of cooperating only if they have identified a 
self-control conflict in the first place. Consistent with their predictions, from a simplified version 
of the model presented in this paper, individuals in the treatment intended to raise the likelihood 
of conflict identification exhibit a positive correlation between trait self-control and cooperation, 
but those in the treatment intended to lower the likelihood exhibit no correlation. Myrseth et al. 
(2015) manipulated the degree to which the endowment in the public goods game was 
                                                
2 The pattern emerging from dictator games largely mirrors the conflicting pattern from public good games. 
Piovesan and Wengstrӧm (2009) find that selfish choices in a repeated dictator game are correlated with 
lower response times. Studies that manipulate cognitive resources through depletion or load have yielded 
mixed results, namely both evidence for and against the proposition that giving requires deliberation (e.g., 
Hauge et al., 2009; Cornellisen et al., 2011; Schulz et al., 2014; Achtziger et al., 2015). 
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represented in tangible (i.e., cash or tokens) or abstract form (i.e., on a computer screen, as is 
standard). They find a positive correlation between trait self-control and cooperation when the 
endowment was represented in tangible form, but no correlation when the endowment was 
represented abstractly. 
 
 
4. The Model 
Following Myrseth and Fishbach (2009), we propose a two-stage model with a conflict 
identification stage (perception of conflict) and a contribution stage (resolution of the conflict). In 
the model, nature decides in the first stage whether or not an agent identifies conflict between the 
selfish impulse and the better judgment to cooperate (for instance, following a social norm). If 
conflict is not identified, the decision process ends, and the agent contributes zero.3 If identified, 
the agent decides how much effort to invest into self-control effort. 
More formally, we assume that the utility function U of individual i is given by 
 𝑈! = 𝑢 𝜋! − 𝑘 − 𝑠. (1) 
 
Here, iπ  is the individual’s monetary payoff, which depends on the public good technology, the 
relative price of the private good, and on the contribution costs to the public good (i.e., 
( , ( ))i if c Gπ = ⋅ and 
𝜕𝜋𝑖𝜕𝑐𝑖 < 0; where G denotes the public technology); 0≥ic  is individual 'i s  
contribution to the public good from the available endowment (and the rest is left for the 
consumption of the private good). With respect to the public good technology, we assume that 
 
0/)(,/)(1/)(
/)(
>∂⋅∂∂⋅∂⋅<<∂⋅∂<
∂⋅∂
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i cGcGncG
n
cG
, (2) 
 
with n representing the group size. Condition (2) ensures for the monetary maximizing individual 
that the problem constitutes a social dilemma—as the selfish individual optimum and the 
                                                
3 It is possible, for a variety of reasons, that a decision maker by default contributes a positive amount. In 
the spirit of parsimony and modeling convenience, we abstract from such cases, but we shall revisit this 
point in the Experimental Results section. 
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collective optimum are in conflict. The function 𝑢(𝜋!) is strictly concave, i.e., ( )' 0>iu π  and 
( )'' 0<iu π . One can interpret the concavity of the utility function for monetary payoffs as 
diminishing marginal utility or risk aversion, but one can also view it as a weight for utility 
derived from monetary payoffs vis-à-vis the costs k and s. For simplicity, we will speak of 
concavity as risk aversion. 
The second term of the utility function, ( )2
2
i
ik m c
β
= − , is the cost of deviating from 
others’ average contributions to the public good, where the average contribution of others is 
denoted m; the parameter 0iβ ≥  captures individual sensitivity to this difference. Our utility 
function thus incorporates other-regarding concerns in a manner similar to that of warm-glow, 
altruism, and reciprocity models.  
Finally, s  represents the “opportunity-based” specification of self-control cost, from 
Fudenberg and Levine (2006). We assume that the “selfish self” (in their terminology, the short-
run self) is purely selfish and therefore will only maximize monetary payoff from the public 
good, implying a zero contribution in the linear mechanism. The potentially “pro-social self” 
(Fudenberg and Levine’s long-run self), however, solves a maximization problem that contains 
all attributes in iU  and may therefore decide on a positive contribution, 0>ic . Self-control cost 
in this framework is proportional to the difference in payoffs resulting from the payoff 
maximizing contribution (zero) and from the actual contribution. The cost of contributing for the 
pro-social (long-run) self, therefore, is 𝜋! 0 − 𝜋! 𝑐! , which is a cost (non-negative) whenever 0 ≠ 𝑐!. To account for individual differences in self-control cost, we divide this expression by 
0iω > , the individual willpower parameter. Hence, the cost of self-control for the utility 
maximizing agent becomes s = 𝜋! 0 − 𝜋! 𝑐! /𝜔!.  
The decision problem of the agent is straightforward. Nature exogenously determines 
whether or not the agent identifies conflict. The binary identification function {0,1}ϕ =  implies 
conflict identification when 1ϕ = , and no conflict identification when 0.ϕ =  The model has a 
trivial solution in the case of 0;ϕ =  the agent does not identify conflict, maximizes monetary 
payoff, and hence contributes nothing (see footnote 3). If the agent identifies conflict ( 1ϕ = ), 
however, she proceeds to the conflict stage and maximizes iU  with respect to ic . We derive the 
following propositions. All proofs can be found in Appendix D. 
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PROPOSITION 1: Given that the agent has identified conflict ( 1ϕ = ) and ωi and βi are 
sufficiently large, raising willpower increases contributions. 
 
If the agent has identified conflict, she needs to determine how much she wishes to contribute. If 
she is sufficiently pro-social, this will be a positive contribution. Contributing, however, is costly 
both in terms of money and in terms of self-control. An increase in willpower reduces marginal 
self-control cost of contributing and therefore raises contributions. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: Given that the agent has identified conflict ( 1ϕ = ) and ωi and βi are 
sufficiently large, raising willpower leads to a smaller increase in contributions if risk aversion is 
high. 
 
As willpower increases, the marginal self-control cost of contributing decreases, which increases 
contributions—given that the individual has identified self-control conflict, and is sufficiently 
pro-social to prefer a positive contribution level. The reduction in marginal self-control cost 
resulting from an increase in willpower, however, diminishes if risk aversion increases (concavity 
increases). Consequently, there is a smaller increase in contributions. We therefore expect an 
interaction between willpower and risk preferences on contributions. The more concave the utility 
function is, the smaller is the positive effect of willpower on contributions.4 
Having outlined the model and derived the main predictions, we next present the 
experimental design and procedure. 
 
 
5. Experimental Design and Procedure 
5.1 The Basic Public Goods Game and the Strategy Vector Method 
In our experiment, the public goods game builds on the following linear payoff function for 
individual i 
4
1
20 0.4 ,
=
= − + ∑i i j
j
c cπ
 
(3) 
                                                
4 The effect in Proposition 2 holds when risk aversion refers to the concavity in the utility of monetary 
payoffs.  
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where ic  denotes the contribution of individual i to the public good. Each group consists of four 
randomly matched individuals, and each individual receives an endowment of 20 experimental 
points (the experimental currency unit). The marginal per capita return (MPCR = 𝜕𝐺(. )/𝜕𝑐!) 
from investing in the public good is 0.4, fulfilling the conditions for a social dilemma. Assuming 
that participants are rational and self-interested, any MPCR < 1 yields a dominant strategy to free-
ride. From the perspective of social welfare, it is optimal to contribute the entire endowment 
because MPCR⋅n > 1. 
The preference elicitation and the incentive mechanism in our experiment closely follow 
Fischbacher et al. (2001). More specifically, participants are asked to make two decisions: first, to 
make an unconditional contribution to the public good, and, then, to submit a conditional 
contribution schedule. The unconditional contribution is a single integer number satisfying 0 ≤ ic
 
≤ 20. For the conditional contribution, participants indicate how much they would contribute to 
the public good for any possible average contribution (rounded to integers) of the other three 
players in their group. For each of the 21 possible averages from 0 to 20, participants must decide 
on a contribution between (and including) 0 and 20. This is a variant of the strategy vector 
method (Selten, 1967). 
To ensure incentive-compatibility, both the unconditional and the conditional 
contributions are potentially payoff-relevant. For one group member, randomly determined by the 
toss of a four-sided die, the conditional contribution is relevant; unconditional contributions are 
relevant for the other three group members.5 More specifically, the three unconditional 
contributions from a group, and the corresponding conditional contribution (for the specific 
average of the three unconditional contributions), determine the sum of contributions to the public 
good. One can then compute individual earnings, according to equation (3). 
In addition, participants are asked to guess the average unconditional contribution of the 
other three group members (rounded to integers). The guessing stage is implemented after the 
contribution stages and is not mentioned in the written instructions. As in Gächter and Renner 
(2010), participants are monetarily rewarded depending on the accuracy of their guesses. 
However, we use a slightly stronger incentive mechanism. If a participant’s guess equals exactly 
the average unconditional contribution of the other three group members, the participant earns 
nine additional points from the guess; if there is a difference of one between the guess and the 
                                                
5 Each group member is assigned a number from one to four. At the end of the experimental session, and 
monitored by the experimenter, a randomly selected group member rolls the die. 
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average, the participant earns six additional points; and a difference of two results in additional 
three points earned. Larger differences are neither rewarded nor punished. 
 
5.2 Elicitation of Risk Preferences 
We employed the design by Holt and Laury (2002) to measure individual risk preferences. Each 
participant, without interacting with any other participant, is required to make ten risky choices. 
For each choice, participants choose between two options, labeled X and Y. Both options include 
a lottery with the same probabilities, but with different payoffs. Option X is the relatively safer 
option; its highest outcome is lower than the highest outcome from option Y, but its lowest 
outcome is higher than the lowest outcome from option Y. Payoffs are fixed throughout the 
choice sequence. However, in both options the probability of receiving the higher payoff 
increases by ten percentage points, from 10% in decision 1 to 100% in decision 10.6 
As the participant moves down the sequence of choices, depending on the participant’s 
preference for risk, the participant at some point may switch from Option X (the relatively safe 
choice) to Option Y (the relatively risky choice). In the case of extreme risk-loving, the 
participant would always choose Option Y. Switching from Y to X, or always choosing X is 
incompatible with consistent money-maximizing behavior. One can compute an individual’s 
degree of risk aversion by using the point at which she switches from Option X to Option Y.7 
Upon completing this task (and the rest of the experiment), one of the ten lotteries is selected 
randomly and played for real. All lotteries are thus potentially payoff-relevant, and participants 
could in this part earn up to 3.85 euro. 
 
5.3 Measurement of Conflict Identification and of Trait Self-Control 
After risk preference elicitation, we implement a standard measure of trait self-control: the 
Rosenbaum Self-Control Schedule (Rosenbaum, 1980a), henceforth abbreviated RSS.8 This 
measure has been validated against a battery of relevant personality measures, and against 
behavioral tasks associated with self-control, such as resisting pain (Rosenbaum, 1980b), coping 
                                                
6 We provide the specific numbers used for this risk elicitation procedure in Appendix C. 
7 Switching points can readily be converted into risk aversion parameters of parametric models, such as 
CRRA. As the choice of a model would be arbitrary, we use the switching point in our analysis. 
8 The Rosenbaum Self-Control Schedule (1980a) is included in Appendix A. We translated this scale to 
German; the same translation was used in Myrseth et al. (2015).   
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with stress (Rosenbaum and Smira, 1986; Rosenbaum, 1989), coping with mental disability 
(Rosenbaum and Palmon, 1984), coping with seasickness (Rosenbaum and Rolnick, 1983), 
quitting smoking (Katz and Singh, 1986), saving over spending (Romal and Kaplan, 1995), and 
curtailing procrastination (Milgram et al., 1988). 
We build on the finding from personality psychology that the tendency to apply self-
control strategies represents a stable trait within the individual over time. Indeed, the tendency to 
apply self-control strategies remains remarkably consistent throughout life. For example, Mischel 
and colleagues found that a child’s performance at age 4 on an instant gratification task (one 
cookie now, or two cookies later) predicted later in life their cognitive control (Eigsti et al., 
2006), ability to concentrate, self-control, interpersonal competence, SAT scores, and their drug 
use (Mischel et al. 1988; Mischel et al., 1989; Shoda et al., 1990; Ayduk et al., 2000).  
Critically, self-control strategies are relevant to the decision to indulge only when the 
individual has identified self-control conflict.9 Therefore, one approach to investigating whether 
the problem of pro-social versus selfish behavior resembles that of self-control is to test whether 
self-control strategies are positively associated with pro-social behavior when the individual has 
felt conflicted, but less so or not at all when the individual has not. It would be appropriate, 
therefore, to measure experienced conflict. To capture recollection of feelings of mixed emotion, 
we posed in the last part of the experiment (but before administering the RSS) a question similar 
to that used in Aaker et al. (2008): “To what extent did you experience conflict when deciding 
how much to contribute?” Participants answered this question on a continuous scale ranging from 
0 (“not at all”) to 100 (“very much”).10 
 
5.4 Experimental Procedure 
The computer-based experiment was conducted at the experimental laboratory MELESSA of the 
University of Munich in October 2009 and in March 2010, using the experimental software z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and the organizational software Orsee (Greiner, 2004). A total of 144 
                                                
9 Such self-control strategies may take a variety of forms, and common examples include counteractive 
self-control (e.g., Trope and Fishbach, 2000; Myrseth et al., 2009) and pre-commitment (e.g., Schelling, 
1984). 
10 Note that the original German question clearly hinted at the normative conflict, without being too 
suggestive. After asking the experimental participant to recollect his or her decision about contributions, the 
following question was posed: “In welchem Maße fühlten Sie sich bei Ihrer Entscheidung in einem 
(inneren) Zwiespalt?” The term “Zwiespalt” can also be translated to English as “dilemma”. 
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undergraduate students from all disciplines, except economics, participated in six sessions, each 
with 24 participants. Approximately 62% of participants were female. Sessions lasted up to 1½ 
hours, and the average payoff was 13.4 euro, including a show-up fee of 4 euro.11 
Upon arrival, experimental participants were seated in separate cubicles. Each session 
started with instructions for the public goods game. At this stage it was made clear that there 
would be additional parts of the experiments, but that the instructions for those parts would only 
be handed out after the completion of the current part. It was also emphasized to participants that 
decisions in one part would be completely unrelated to those in the other parts. Participants 
received neutrally-framed, written instructions (see Appendix B), which were read aloud to 
ensure common knowledge.12 Everybody had the opportunity to ask questions in private. The 
experiment continued only after all participants had completed a series of computerized exercises 
(where they calculated profits for different contribution levels in the public goods game), and 
after all participants had correctly understood the procedures. It was made very clear that 
feedback and profit information would only be given at the end of the experiment. This was done 
to reduce the potential spillover effects of earnings, from one part of the experiment to the next. 
Upon completing the public goods game (part 1), participants received instructions for the 
risk preference elicitation (part 2) and a variant of the trust game (part 3).13 Following part 3, 
participants answered the conflict experience question, the RSS, and some questions about socio-
demographics and individual background. The final stage of the experiment included feedback on 
the decisions of group members in the public goods game, chance moves, and the individual 
earnings. Payments were made privately and in cash. 
 
 
6. Experimental Results 
We hypothesized that self-control would positively correlate with contributions to the public good 
for individuals who had identified a self-control conflict between better judgment to cooperate 
and the temptation to act in self-interest. We did not expect a significant correlation for 
                                                
11 Each experimental point earned in the public goods game is exchanged at the pre-announced rate of 
1 point = 0.33 euro. 
12 All instructions, written and oral, were given in German. English versions are included in this paper. 
13 Kocher et al. (2011) analyze the association between cooperation, trust, and risk (but not self-control) 
based on these data. 
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individuals who had not identified conflict. The RSS represents our proxy for self-control, and a 
dummy variable, extracted from participants’ self-reports of conflict intensity, represents our 
proxy for identification of self-control conflict. 
While the response variable for conflict intensity is continuous, there is no reason to 
expect a linear effect of experienced conflict on the impact of trait self-control. Rather, a 
threshold effect of the former on the latter seems more appropriate; individuals who identified 
self-control conflict would draw on their self-control strategies to promote pro-social behavior, 
whereas others would not. A natural, theoretically motivated threshold for our analysis, therefore, 
would be the lowest positive, non-zero report of experienced conflict (identification). 
Accordingly, our conflict dummy takes the value of zero for participants reporting no conflict 
(“0” on the conflict intensity question), and 1 otherwise. Our subsequent pattern of results also 
holds qualitatively when the threshold for conflict identification is set at the median conflict 
response (“21” on the conflict intensity question), which corresponds to the midpoint of the 
response distribution. And for both conflict definitions, our results hold when including the 
continuous conflict measure as a control variable. 
 
Insert Table 1 around here 
 
Our full sample consists of 144 subjects, but 15 provided inconsistent answers in the 
Holt-Laury-task. In our subsequent analyses, we have included all subjects and added a dummy to 
control for inconsistency.14 The summary statistics in Table 1 reveal that the average 
unconditional contributions in our sample, approximately 34% of the endowment, resemble those 
reported in the related literature (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). 
Moreover, the RSS scores of our participants appear roughly similar to those found in other 
studies: the standard deviation is within the range of those found in the original samples studied 
by Rosenbaum (1980a, b), but the mean is slightly below the corresponding range of means (16.7 
vs. a range of 23 to 27). Overall, our summary statistics are in line with previous findings. 
 
                                                
14 The results do not depend on the inclusion of inconsistent responses; the pattern remains the same when 
we include only those who provided consistent answers in the Holt-Laury task. 
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6.1 Conditional Contributions in the Public Goods Game 
We start by examining contribution schedules. Recall that each of our participants had to indicate 
21 contribution levels for all possible average contribution levels (rounded to integers) of the 
other group members. The elicitation of the schedule was fully incentivized. Table 2 provides test 
results for our two propositions on the conditional contribution data. More specifically, it presents 
a tobit analysis of conditional contributions as a function of RSS scores (denoted RSS), risk 
preferences based on the switching point in the choice list task (denoted Risk), average 
contributions of others (denoted Others), the respective interaction terms, socio-demographic 
controls (gender, age, and an income proxy), and the inconsistency dummy.15 We have split the 
estimations based on whether an individual has identified self-control conflict (specifications (6)-
(10), based on 108 individuals) or not (specifications (1)-(5), based on 36 individuals).16 
Specifications (1)-(4) and (6)-(9) all replicate a commonly found pattern: the level of others’ 
average contributions is a strong determinant of the decision maker's own contributions (e.g., 
Gächter, 2007; Kocher et al., 2008; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). It is noteworthy that this 
variable does not appear significant in specifications (5) and (10), a point to which we shall 
return. 
 
Insert Table 2 around here 
 
Consistent with Proposition 1, specifications (7) and (9) yield positive and significant 
correlations between conditional contributions and RSS for those who have identified conflict; no 
such positive correlation is obtained in specifications (2) and (4) for those who reported not 
having identified conflict. Moreover, and consistent with Proposition 2, specification (9) yields a 
negative coefficient on the interaction term between RSS and risk preferences for those who have 
identified conflict; this coefficient, however, is not significant at conventional levels. We 
summarize our findings for conditional contributions in Results 1 and 2—corresponding to 
Propositions 1 and 2, respectively. 
 
                                                
15 We present here and hereafter only tobit regressions, which account for the lower and the upper 
contribution limits, but our results also hold for OLS. Regression tables are available upon request. 
16 Note that we have 21 observations per individual, and we report robust standard errors to account for the 
dependence in the data. 
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RESULT 1: Conditional contributions are positively correlated with self-control, for individuals 
who have experienced conflict. 
 
RESULT 2: The positive correlation between conditional contributions and self-control 
diminishes weakly, but not significantly, as risk aversion increases, for individuals who have 
experienced conflict.  
 
Specification (10) pertains to individuals who identified self-control conflict, and it 
includes all aforementioned variables and the respective interactions. Empirically, these 
interaction terms may matter. This is especially true for others’ average contributions, which may 
influence conditional cooperators. Indeed, the interaction between RSS and Others is positive and 
significant. That is, the greater is the level of others’ average contributions, the stronger the 
positive association between self-control and conditional contributions. This means that higher 
contributions of others make it easier for conditional cooperators to overcome the temptation to 
free-ride. This result is not obtained for specification (5), which includes only those who did not 
identify self-control conflict. 
 
RESULT 3: The positive correlation between conditional contributions and self-control becomes 
stronger as the level of others’ average contribution increases, for individuals who have 
experienced conflict.  
 
Furthermore, the three-way interaction between RSS, risk preferences, and Others is 
negative and significant. In other words, with a higher level of others’ average contributions, 
there is a weaker association between self-control and conditional contributions for more risk-
averse individuals. Again, we do not obtain the result from specification (5), which includes only 
those who did not experience self-control conflict.17 We summarize the finding in Result 4. 
 
                                                
17 We have for expositional purposes decided to split the data according to conflict identification. When 
instead aggregating the data and including in the specifications a dummy for conflict identification, the 
same patterns obtain. When we interact the conflict dummy with the relevant variables, the interactions are 
significant and confirm the results in Tables 2 and 4. However, such specifications are more cumbersome to 
interpret, in particular the four-way interaction between conflict identification, RSS, Risk, and Others. 
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RESULT 4: With higher average contributions of others, the strength of the positive correlation 
between conditional contributions and self-control diminishes with higher levels of risk aversion, 
for individuals who experienced conflict. 
 
In order to illustrate the results from specification (10), which includes those who did 
experience self-control conflict, we plot in Figure 1 the unit increase in conditional contribution, 
from a one-standard-deviation increase in RSS, at different levels of risk preferences and others’ 
contributions. At low levels of Others, there is little difference in conditional contribution for 
various levels of risk preferences. Similarly, at high levels of risk aversion, there is little 
difference in conditional contribution for various levels of Others. However, a one-standard-
deviation increase in RSS yields higher levels of conditional contributions when there are both 
lower levels of risk aversion and higher levels of Others. 
 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
 
The main effect for Others, but also the significant effects of RSS and the interaction of 
RSS with Risk, statistically disappear in specification (10). It appears that there is no effect of 
others’ contributions, independent of self-control and risk preferences. 
 
6.2 Types of Contributors in the Public Goods Game 
We followed the standard approach in classifying four types of contributors (see Fischbacher et 
al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). Conditional cooperators submitted a contribution 
schedule displaying a (weakly, with at least one strict step) monotonically increasing contribution 
for an increasing average contribution of the other group members.18 Free-riders are 
characterized by zero conditional contributions for every possible average contribution of the 
other members. Hump-shape contributors (also known as triangle contributors) exhibit (weakly, 
with at least one strict step) monotonically increasing contributions up to a certain average level 
of others’ contributions, above which their contributions schedule is (weakly, with at least one 
strict step) monotonically decreasing. The category referred to as Residual constitutes the 
                                                
18 We also included those without a weakly monotonically increasing contribution, but with a highly 
significant (p-value < 0.01) positive Spearman rank correlation coefficient between own and others’ 
contributions, as in Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010). 
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remaining participants.19 The distribution of types based on our data, and shown in Table 3, 
corresponds to those found in past studies (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001; Kocher et al., 2008; 
Herrman and Thöni, 2009; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Martinsson et al., 2013). 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Given that free-riders by definition contribute less than do other types, and given that they 
happened to have about the same RSS score, and about the same risk preferences, our model 
would imply that they were less likely to identify a self-control conflict between keeping the 
money and contributing.20 Consequently, we would predict that free-riders were less likely to 
have drawn on their self-control strategies to promote pro-social behavior. Indeed, consistent with 
this implication, free-riders reported a significantly lower average level of conflict than did other 
types (p-values < 0.01; two-sided Mann-Whitney-U-tests). In other words, free-riders seem to 
have contributed less because they were less likely to see a self-control conflict in the first place 
and, therefore, they were less likely to draw on their self-control strategies to promote pro-social 
behavior. We summarize this finding for contributor types in Result 5.21 
 
RESULT 5: Free-riders experience lower levels of conflict than do other types, but they do not 
exhibit different risk preferences or scores on the self-control measure (RSS). 
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the self-serving bias of conditional cooperators (i.e., 
the difference between perfect conditional cooperation and the actual conditional contribution of 
an individual) is related to trait self-control. In a regression also controlling for risk preferences, a 
higher level of self-control exhibits a strong and significant (p < 0.01) negative association with 
the size of the individual self-serving bias of conditional cooperators.22 
                                                
19 We elect not to label this category Others, as is conventional in the literature, because the label would be 
identical to the one that we have employed in our regression analyses. To avoid confusion, we instead refer 
to the residual class of contributor types as Residual. 
20 The RSS of free-riders is not significantly lower than that of either conditional cooperators or hump-
shape contributors (all p-values > 0.4; two-sided Mann-Whitney-U-tests). 
21 The result provides ex-post evidence for the assumption in our model that no conflict identification 
implies low levels of contribution. See footnote 3. 
22 The regression table is available on request. 
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6.3 Unconditional Contributions in the Public Goods Game 
Our experiment elicited conditional and unconditional contributions to the public good. While we 
deem the contribution schedule (conditional contributions) essential for testing our hypotheses, 
examining participants’ unconditional contributions can provide valuable robustness checks.  
An initial analysis of the data reveals the predicted association between RSS and 
cooperation also for participants’ unconditional contributions. We compare the means of 
unconditional contributions by high versus low RSS scores (above vs. below the mean) and by 
experienced conflict versus no conflict. Among participants who reported conflict, those with 
high RSS scores contributed more (on average, 8.87) than did those with low RSS scores (4.62). 
The difference is highly significant (p-value < 0.01; Mann-Whitney-U-test). However, among 
participants who did not report having identified conflict, those with high RSS scores did not 
contribute significantly more (4.62) than did those with low RSS scores (7.13) (p-value = 0.29; 
two-sided Mann-Whitney-U-test). 
Table 4 presents tobit regressions for unconditional contributions as a function of RSS 
scores, risk preferences, and the interaction between the two. As with conditional contributions, 
we have split the estimations based on whether individuals identified self-control conflict 
(specifications (14)-(16)) or not (specifications (11)-(13)). Consistent with Proposition 1, 
specifications (14) and (15), which exclude the interaction term, reveal that RSS is positively 
correlated with unconditional contributions for individuals who identified self-control conflict. 
However, the corresponding specifications for those who did not identify conflict, (11) and (12), 
yield a negative and significant correlation between RSS and unconditional contributions. That is, 
given that they failed to identify a self-control conflict, individuals with higher trait self-control 
contributed less to the public good than those with lower trait self-control. This result is 
consistent with the assumption that failure to identify self-control conflict implies self-interested 
preferences. Higher trait self-control should help the individual to better achieve her own 
interests, which in this case means cooperating less. 
Specification (16) includes the interaction term between RSS and risk preferences, and it 
includes only those who have identified self-control conflict. Consistent with Proposition 2, the 
coefficient for RSS is positive and significant, and the coefficient on the interaction term for RSS 
and risk preferences is negative and significant. In other words, the positive association between 
RSS and unconditional contributions is weaker for more risk-averse individuals. The 
corresponding estimation for individuals who did not identify conflict, specification (13), 
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however, yields the opposite pattern. This is also consistent with the assumption of self-interested 
preferences among those who fail to identify self-control conflict. Although higher trait self-
control helps the individual better achieve her interests, higher payoffs will matter less when the 
utility function is more concave. 
We summarize these findings for unconditional contributions, which reinforce our 
conclusions from Section 4.1, in results 1’ and 2’, corresponding to Propositions 1 and 2, 
respectively. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
 
RESULT 1’: Unconditional contributions are positively correlated with self-control, for 
individuals who experienced conflict. 
 
RESULT 2’: The positive correlation between unconditional contributions and self-control 
diminishes with higher levels of risk aversion, for individuals who experienced conflict.  
 
The analogues of Results 3 and 4 are more difficult to re-test with data on unconditional 
contributions. Because we have elicited expectations of others’ contributions immediately after 
asking for unconditional contributions, the data are less suited than are the conditional schedules. 
This is mainly because of a potential influence of unconditional contributions on expectations, for 
example, through the anchoring or the false consensus effect (Gächter, 2007). Accordingly, when 
we reproduce specification (10), substituting the expectations variable for Others, the only 
variables yielding statistical significance are expectations and the control variable for inconsistent 
responses in the choice list task.  
As a final note, the coefficient on Risk alone does not explain unconditional contributions 
in any significant way.23  
 
 
                                                
23 This result is also reported in Kocher et al. (2011). 
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7. Discussion and Conclusion 
Models that posit a self-control problem between self-interest and a better judgment to act pro-
socially hold a major advantage over alternative models. They can explain commonly observed 
cooperation patterns independently of strategic reciprocity, and so they can account for stylized 
facts arising from both one-shot games and from repeated interaction. Such models can also 
explain behavior in dictator games, which do not provide any incentive for selfish players to 
induce generous behavior by others. In this paper, we have developed a self-control model of 
cooperation, from which we have derived and empirically tested two main predictions. Both 
address the hypothesis that individuals may experience a self-control conflict between acting in 
self-interest or in the interest of the common good. 
We find support for our predictions. Self-control is positively associated both with 
conditional and unconditional contributions in a linear public goods game, consistent with 
Proposition 1. Moreover, there is a weaker association between self-control and unconditional 
contributions for more risk-averse individuals, consistent with Proposition 2. In addition, we find 
that higher levels of others’ average contributions strengthen the association between self-control 
and conditional cooperation. Finally, and addressing the widely observed phenomenon of 
imperfect conditional cooperation, we observe that the self-serving bias decreases in higher levels 
of self-control.24 The aforementioned results hold only for individuals who reported feeling 
conflicted during the allocation task, also in line with our model. Our findings thus corroborate 
prior evidence for the idea that the social dilemma may be understood as a problem of self-control 
(e.g., Martinsson et al., 2014; Myrseth et al., 2015; Osgood and Muraven, 2015). 
We also study the distribution of contributor types. Our analysis reveals that free-riders 
are similar to other types, both in their levels of self-control and in their risk preferences, but 
differ in their reported experience of conflict; free-riders seem to have cooperated less because 
they were less likely to see a self-control conflict in the first place—and thus less likely to draw 
on self-control strategies to promote pro-social behavior. This is consistent with findings from 
Martinsson et al. (2014), who used similar experimental procedures, though without measuring 
risk preferences. A recent mouse-tracking study by Kieslich and Hilbig (2014), however, yields 
the opposite pattern. They find more conflict for free-riders than for cooperators, but they gauge 
                                                
24 Note that our rationale, in principle, also could account for a reduction of contribution levels over and 
above a certain level of average others’ contributions, as observed for hump-shape contributors. It would 
require, beyond that level, a strictly convex temptation function. 
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conflict from movements of the mouse cursor on the computer screen rather than from a self-
report measure, as we do here.25 Future research might investigate whether results depend on the 
method by which conflict is measured. 
Aside from addressing theoretically motivated predictions, our study also yields two 
interesting incidental results. The first concerns the question of altruism. Our main regression 
specifications (10) and (16) failed to yield positive intercepts. Hence, we find no evidence of 
altruistic behavior that is independent of our three theoretically motivated determinants of 
cooperation: self-control, contributions of others, and risk preferences. The second result refers to 
an analogous finding for the commonly observed main effect of the average contribution of 
others. Our main regression specification for conditional contributions (10) yields a non-
significant coefficient. It appears that the average contribution of others does not influence 
cooperation independently of our three theoretically motivated determinants. Future research 
might explore the stability and meaning of these results, across measures and experimental 
paradigms. 
These results notwithstanding, a note of caution is due. Our empirical strategy is based on 
an analysis of correlations, and one should thus be careful in inferring causality. However, our 
theory makes clear causal predictions, with which our pattern of correlations is consistent. It is 
difficult to come up with plausible, parsimonious alternative accounts of our pattern of results, 
obtained both for conditional and unconditional cooperation, but we do acknowledge that the 
question of causality merits further investigation. Future studies might, for example, manipulate 
the independent variables that were measured here. To this end, Martinsson et al. (2014) 
implemented a perceptual framing manipulation to influence identification of self-control conflict 
in a public goods game. Consistent with our results, they find that the frame hypothesized to 
promote conflict identification yielded a stronger correlation between cooperation and the 
Rosenbaum (1980a) measure of self-control than did the frame hypothesized to inhibit 
identification.  
While we have provided evidence for the conceptualization that temptation to act in self-
interest may conflict with better judgment to act in the interest of others, we do not wish to 
overstate the generality of our findings. We have reason to think that our conceptualization 
applies in situations where feelings of greed dominate those (if any) to act pro-socially. And the 
standard experimental protocol for the public goods game is a fitting case. Of course, as 
O’Donoghue and Loewenstein (2007) suggest, and Andreoni et al. (2011) imply, the pattern in 
                                                
25 See Myrseth and Wollbrant (2015b) for a comment. 
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other circumstances may reverse. Specifically, when empathetic emotion is particularly strong, 
individuals may feel tempted to act pro-socially—even knowing that they ought not. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Unit increase in conditional contribution due to a one-standard-deviation 
increase in RSS, evaluated at different values of Risk and Others. 
 
Note: The marginal effect of RSS is evaluated using specification (10) in Table 2. The change 
in conditional contributions due to a change in RSS can be approximately written as: 
ΔConditional contribution = (-0.144+ 0.031Risk + 0.031Others - 0.004RiskOthers)ΔRSS. The 
values chosen for each variable are the mean, one standard deviation above the mean and one 
standard deviation below the mean (N=144).  
 
  
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Unit increase 
in conditional 
contribution 
Others 
Risk aversion 
4.57 
7.70 
6.13 
16 
10 
4 
  
33 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
Note: * denotes a variable constructed using the strategy method.  ** denotes a response variable not used 
in the analysis, but transformed to a dummy; overall 36 out of 144 respondents reported zero, indicating 
"Not at all" as a response. 
 
 
Variable Description
Number of 
observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Unconditional contribution Unconditional contribution to 
the public good.
144 6.75 5.93 0 20
Conditional contribution* Conditional contribution to the 
public good.
3024 6.02 6.29 0 20
Conflict intensity** A continuous variable, ranging 
from 0 = "Not at all" to 100 = 
"Very much", in response to 
the question "To what extent 
did you experience conflict 
when deciding how much to 
contribute? "
144 33.14 32.06 0 100
Conflict A dummy variable equal to 
zero if the participant 
responded 0 to the conflict 
intensity question and equal to 
one if the participant indicated 
a positive number.
144 0.75 0.43 0 1
Risk Risk index derived from the 
experiment (switching point).
144 6.13 1.56 2 10
RSS The Rosenbaum Self-Control 
Schedule score.
144 16.66 22.44 -46 76
High RSS A dummy variable equal to 
one if the participant has a 
RSS score larger than the 
mean (17) and zero otherwise 
144 0.51 0.50 0 1
Inconsistent A dummy variable equal to 
one if the participant answered 
inconsistently in the risk 
experiment
144 0.10 0.31 0 1
Others* A vector of integer numbers 
between 0 and 20 indicating all 
possible average contributions 
of the other three group 
members in the conditional 
contribution task
3024 10.00 6.06 0 20
